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Abstract 
 
This paper employs a DEA-type Malmquist index approach to evaluate the impact of financial 
liberalization on the productivity changes of public, private and foreign banks in Turkey during 
the period between 1981 and 1990. The results indicate that all forms of banks have benefited 
from financial liberalization. However, foreign banks were found to be the most productive, 
followed by private banks and public banks respectively. The major source of productivity gains is 
scale changes for public and private banks and technical progress for foreign banks. It also seems 
that productivity growth indices of all banks converge towards the end of liberalization period.  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades financial market deregulation and liberalization has transformed the banking 
systems of a large number of countries. These reforms are sure to have a profound effect on the development of the 
financial system in these countries, and their overall macroeconomic performances. Apparently, the policy makers 
believe that improving the efficiency and performance of financial systems is better implemented through financial 
liberalization and deregulatory policies aiming at increasing bank competition on price, product, services, and 
territorial rivalry. However, the empirical evidence on the impact of such polices so far is mixed. Moreover, in a 
recent study, Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) draw attention to the relationship between bank ownership and 
efficiency, and argue that existing literature provides relatively little evidence about the relative efficiency of 
different ownership forms of financial firms in competitive environments. There are even fewer studies that examine 
the differential impacts of deregulatory policies on the banks of different forms, particularly in the developing 
countries. 
 
Most of the survey studies such as Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993), Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1998) admit that “most of the empirical research has focused on U.S. banking 
organizations” and thus “with so few cross-country comparative efficiency studies to draw upon, the results obtained 
so far should be taken with caution”. Evidently, within their 130 and 250-reference long survey papers, respectively, 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) cite only one Turkish bank study, whereas Berger et al. (1998) cite none. The reason, 
actually, is the limited existence of empirical studies on Turkish banks, especially in the area of productive 
efficiency. Therefore, the primary motivation for this study is to contribute to the debate about the productivity of 
the banking sector and provide empirical evidence that can help new policy formulations in the liberalized / 
deregulated era.  
 
In the early 1980s Turkey has began to follow financial liberalization policies and undergone a number of 
major policy changes in bank regulation. For example, elimination of controls on interest rates, a significant 
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reduction in directed credit programs, and the relaxation of entry barriers into the banking systems have been the 
two key elements of the banking related policy changes (Isik and Hassan, 2002). The liberalization program either 
abolished or relaxed regulations, and the banking industry responded quickly to these developments. Turkish 
banking system is also interesting because of the diversity of bank ownership form, preponderance of public banks 
in the oligopolistic and segmented market, and the relationship between macroeconomic environment and banking 
sector development. Certainly these industry conditions and the type of liberalization/deregulation measures 
implemented affect the performance of the banks during liberalization period (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The 
objective of this study is to measure, and to explain measured variation in the performance of Turkish commercial 
banks throughout the financial liberalization period. Specifically, utilizing a DEA-type Malmquist total factor 
productivity change index and 10-year series of data (1981-1990), this paper examines the response of public, 
private and foreign banks to the liberalization polices. 
 
2.  An overview of the financial liberalization in Turkish banking system 
 
Throughout the 1980s Turkish financial system has undergone strong legal, structural and institutional 
changes. Legal and institutional arrangements were introduced to foster the development of the money and capital 
markets and to deepen the financial system. The first attempt to sell Government securities through periodic auctions 
started in 1985. The Interbank Money Market for Turkish Lira (TL) was formed in 1986 to allow banks to meet their 
short-term liquidity needs. The Turkish Privatization Law was enacted in 1986 and a Master Plan was drawn up to 
undertake the privatization of state economic enterprises. Open market operations and auditing of banks by 
independent external auditors started in 1987. Unified accounting principles and a standard reporting system were 
adopted in the same year. Foreign Exchange and Foreign Banknote Markets were established in April 1989. The 
liberalization of foreign exchange regulations increased banks‟ foreign exchange transactions. By the end of 1980s, 
foreign exchange deposits started to surpass the volume of the TL denominated deposits in the sector. During this 
period, Turkish banks also took an interest in doing business abroad whether by purchasing banks in foreign 
countries or by opening branches and representative offices, and began increasingly operating in international 
markets dealing with extensive off-balance sheet activities such as swaps and forward agreements.  
 
In this new business conditions, traditional banks have found themselves in a stern competition not only 
with recently opened domestic banks but also with foreign banks. In response, those established banks have 
concentrated on computerization and automation projects to level with the state of art technology of the new foreign 
and domestic banks. In addition, they have undertaken continuous restructuring and downsizing projects to reduce 
the size of their branch networks and operations in rural and unprofitable regions. Financial reforms have been 
successful in attracting new banks into the system. While there were no new entries into the system between 1975 
and 1980, the number of banks operating in Turkey has increased stunningly in the 1980s. For instance, excluding 
failed and merged banks in between, the number of commercial banks increased from just 37 in 1980 to 49 in 1986, 
and to 56 in 1990. While there were only 4 foreign banks operating in the market between 1977 and 1980, the 
number increased to 23 by the end of 1990. Foreign banks have entered the market either by establishing a branch or 
subsidiary. Despite their small market share, foreign banks have an important place in the Turkish banking system 
because of the new concepts and practices they have imported.  
 
Before liberalization, Turkish banks were restricted with respect to the explicit interest rates they could pay 
depositors. In case of interest rate regulation, competition could only take place through quality and convenience to 
clients, which led to a frantic expansion of branch offices all over the country. Another incentive for branching was 
the effective negative interest rates in the inflationary environments of the late 1970s. The remarkable growth efforts 
provided increases in deposits but at the expense of investing in costly new brick-and-mortar branch offices and 
human resources, having contributed to the overwhelming overhead costs whose adverse impacts on banking have 
prevailed for decades. Apparently, when market interest rates exceeded the rate allowed by the state, banks often 
substitute implicit interest payments in the form of improved banking services such as more bank offices or 
employees per capita or per area. 
 
The evolution of competition in banking has principally featured the de-concentration process in the market 
as a result of the described loosening of the heavy regulatory environment in the 1980s. While 5 and 10 largest 
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banks were accounting for around 75% and 90% of all bank deposits, loans, and assets in the early 1970s, their share 
diminished significantly to about 50% and 75%, respectively, by the end of the 1980s. The systematic decline in the 
share of large banks provides evidence for the small and medium size banks‟ continuous efforts to grow by 
expanding their deposit base. One implication is that commercial banking became increasingly competitive over this 
period.   
 
In spite of the persistent efforts to foster competition among firms, the banking sector with still relatively a 
few number of banks seems to carry the signs of a typical oligopolistic market. As compared to the American and 
Western European markets, the financial market in Turkey is extremely oversized, and concentrated by any 
standard. The extensive branching network, and heavy technology built-up of the existent banks, together with 
consumer inertia and the goodwill for established institutions, may have been a formidable barrier for potential bank 
entries in retail banking. As a matter of fact, none of the banks that entered the banking sector during this period has 
extended its presence beyond the three major cities in the country, Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir. Although new banks, 
especially foreign banks, enjoy a better technological position, their entry was important in being innovative in the 
Turkish context, and improving the quality of human capital (Akkurt et al., 1992; Atiyas and Ersel, 1994). 
 
It can be also argued that benefits of the financial liberalization were partly offset because of the unstable 
macroeconomic environment and the increased cost of funds to the banking sector. Financial liberalization policies 
that were implemented in an inflationary environment increased the level of uncertainty and market risk that, in turn, 
affected banks‟ lending behavior adversely. Low risk financial instruments, such as short-term working capital for 
domestic trade, consumer credits, government bonds and treasury bills became the most popular lending forms 
among commercial banks. Hence financial liberalization changed the composition of the banks‟ loan portfolio 
towards short-term lending and public sector debt instruments. Starting from the second half of the 1980‟s, Turkish 
banks -particularly foreign and private banks- have invested their bulk of assets in liquid assets in which the share of 
government securities increased over time. This is also an indication of how quickly the banks adopted themselves 
to the changing new environment.  
 
3.  Literature review 
 
Despite the fact that the primary objective of deregulatory policies has been to improve efficiency, the 
results from different country experiences have reported mixed results. Table 3 tabulates the studies that examined 
the change in the productivity and/or efficiency of the financial institutions in different countries in reaction to 
deregulation and financial reforms undertaken. Norwegian banks‟ productivity and efficiency improved following 
deregulation (Berg, Forsund, and Jansen; 1992), as did Turkish banks in a more liberalized banking environment 
(Zaim, 1995). Shyu (1998) also reported upgraded operating efficiency in the Taiwanese banking system after 
deregulation. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) found that privatization and deregulation improved potential output, as well 
as productivity, among Korean banks.  Thai banks were also benefited from the financial liberalization. Leightner 
and Lovell (1998) documented that the productivity of all banks operating in Thailand grew at an average of 9 
percent per year during the financial liberalization period.  In a recent study Sathye (2002) observed that 
deregulation which started in Australia in early 1980s led to improved productivity in initial years. However a 
careful analysis of recent period covering the period 1995-1999 resulted in a decline in productivity of banks. Sathye 
(2002) calls this a „limit of deregulation‟ syndrome.  
 
Moreover, Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) examined association between organizational form and 
the productive efficiency of Indian banks during the early stages of the ongoing period of liberalization. They found 
that publicly-owned banks have been the most efficient, followed by foreign-owned banks and privately-owned 
banks. Examining the effect of banking deregulation on Greek banks, Noulas (2001) reported that the effect of 
deregulation appears to be positive only for the private banks. However the gap between public banks and private 
banks was found statistically insignificant.  
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Table 1.  Studies On The Impact Of Deregulation And Financial Reforms On Bank Performance 
 
Country Method Author (Date) Journal 
Norway DEA Berg, Forsund, and Jansen (1992) Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
U.S. SCF Humphrey (1993) Journal of Productivity Analysis 
U.S. DEA Grabowski, Rangan & Rezvanian (1993)  Journal of Economics and Business 
U.S. DEA Elyasiani and Mehdian (1995) Applied Economics 
Spain  TFA Lozano (1995a) European J.  of Operational Research 
Turkey DEA Zaim (1995) Applied Financial Economics 
U.S. TFA Humphrey and Pulley (1997) J. of Money, Credit, and Banking 
Spain DEA Grifell-Tatje and Lovell (1997) European J.  of Operational Research 
India DEA Bhattacharyya, Lovell and Sahay (1997) European J.  of Operational Research 
Taiwan DEA Shyu (1998) Journal of Emerging Markets 
Korea DEA Gilbert and Wilson (1998) Journal of Economics and Business 
Thailand  DEA Leightner and Lovell (1998) Journal of Economics and Business 
Greece DEA Noulas (2001) Managerial Finance 
Australia DEA Sathye (2002) Managerial Finance 
1 Key: DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis), TFA (Thick Frontier Approach), SCF (Stochastic Cost Frontier) 
 
 
On the contrary, banking efficiency in the U.S. has relatively remained unchanged after the deregulation of 
the early 1980s (Bauer, Berger, and Humphrey, 1993; Elyasiani and Mehdian, 1995). Also, it was reported in some 
studies that measured bank productivity declined during the post-deregulation era in the U.S. (Humphrey, 1993; 
Humphrey and Pulley, 1997). Spain banks‟ experience was very much like their U.S. counterparts (Grifell-Tatje and 
Lovell, 1997; Lozano, 1995), the efficiency and productivity in Spanish banking has declined in the deregulated 
environment contrary to expectations. These results altogether imply that industry conditions prior to deregulation, 
such as existing excess loan demand in Norway, a desire to rapidly expand market share in Spain, or competition to 
pay higher deposit interest rates in the U.S., can have important impacts on the efficacy of the reforms undertaken. 
As reported above, in some cases, deregulation seems to have brought about a reduction in measured productivity 
rather than an improvement. Thus, the common wisdom, which posits that deregulation always improves efficiency 
and productivity may not be true for all cases. Industry conditions prior to deregulation and other incentives may 
intervene (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
 
As for the Turkish case, there exist a few empirical studies investigating the episode of the Turkish 
liberalization (e.g.; Akkurt et al., 1992; Atiyas and Ersel, 1994; Zaim, 1995; Denizer, 1997; Akcaoglu (1998), 
Kasman, 1998). According to these studies, Turkish banking is now operating in more competitive and open 
environment than the pre-liberalization period, which should boost the performance of Turkish banks by inducing 
more efficient and productive operations for banks to survive in more complex and competitive business conditions. 
Employing a nonparametric approach, Zaim (1995) examined the economic efficiency of Turkish commercial banks 
at two points in time, one in 1981 and the other in 1990. He provided some initial evidence that the performance of 
Turkish banks improved in the post-liberalization period because economic efficiency of institutions in 1990 was 
higher than that in 1981. Denizer (1997), on the other hand, examined the impact of the new entries following the 
deregulation on the competition of the banking market in Turkey. Using the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) 
paradigm as a framework of analysis, he also attempted to determine if there is a relationship between market 
structure and performance of banks. He found that the superior performance was not because of efficient operations 
but it was because of market power. In other words, high profitability appears to have resulted from the banks‟ 
uncompetitive pricing rather than their improved efficiency. He concluded that regulatory and non-regulatory 
barriers should be removed to promote competition because the entry of small-scale firms alone seems not to have 
succeeded to increase the competition in banking. Kasman (2002), using a data set from the period 1988-1998, 
found that although the Turkish commercial banks operated more inefficiently than their U.S. and European peers, 
the annual inefficiency in the sector decreased over the sample period because of the financial liberalization. His 
lower efficiency results compared to those of Zaim (1995) could be partly attributed to the different study periods 
and methodologies utilized. As known, the Turkish banking industry encountered tough business environment in the 
1990s with respect to that in the 1980s because of the Gulf War, several currency and macro-economic crises and 
natural disasters during the last decade. 
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In addition to the above studies, there appears to be an ample room for further research. All of the above 
studies on Turkish banking have invariably focused on efficiency and none of them has investigated the productivity 
impacts of liberalization. Thus, they have not taken into account the shifts in the production frontier that may take 
place as a result of technical progress and innovation. In fact, productivity and efficiency concepts refer to different 
aspects of bank performance. While productivity increases, efficiency may decline between two periods, vice versa. 
This occurs in case the upward shift in the frontier outweighs the movement by the average bank toward the frontier 
(Isik and Hassan, forthcoming). A direct comparison of efficiency measures across periods may not be an indicator 
of absolute improvement or deterioration of efficiency, as it would only show changes in relative efficiency vis-à-vis 
other banks. The frontier could shift from one period to another because of innovation, financial shock or increased 
competition in the market. Moreover, there could be substantial bank entries and exits over time, resulting in 
different samples of banks and thus frontiers across periods. For this reason, in a changing environment, the 
Malmquist index approach is commonly used to calculate absolute improvement or deterioration in bank efficiency 
and productivity (Wheelock and Wilson, 1999). 
 
Furthermore, some researchers picked the beginning year of the reforms or a specific year before the 
reforms as a base year, and another year in the post-deregulation era as a comparison year. However, this leaves the 
conductor of the research a big initiative, discretion, and arbitrariness. For instance, the improvement in one specific 
year in the post-liberalization era relative to a year in the pre-liberalization era could be a product of chance. Thus, 
in order not to let the arbitrary selection of the reference and comparison years impact qualitative results, 
measurement over longer time periods is needed, and this has not been demonstrated yet (Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). 
 
4.  Methodology 
 
We choose the DEA-type Malmquist productivity index in order to investigate the impact of the financial 
liberalization on banking productivity and efficiency of Turkish commercial banks. We adopt DEA because of the 
expressed interest in the Turkish banking industry to control costs in recent years after the liberal policies. Also 
Berger and Humphrey (1997) report that in the financial institutions literature efficiency studies employing non-
parametric approaches outnumber efficiency studies using parametric approaches. 
 
The Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Change index (TFPCH), M, is defined simply as the product of 
efficiency change (EFFCH), how much closer a bank gets to the efficient frontier (catching up), and technological 
change (TECHCH), how much the benchmark production frontier shifts at each bank‟s observed input mix 
(innovation or shock). EFFCH index takes a value greater than 1 in case of efficiency increase, zero in case of no 
efficiency change, or less than 1 in case of efficiency decrease, between periods t and t+1. Similarly, TECCH attains 
a value greater than 1 in case of technical progress, zero in case of stagnation, or less than 1 in case of technical 
regress, between periods t and t+1.  
 
We must first determine a model of bank production before estimating productivity change index and its 
components. Researchers used to compare productivity change mostly by simple cost ratios. However, banking is a 
complicated and sophisticated business and getting to be more like that as time goes by in this rapidly changing 
environment. Thus, representation and evaluation of banking performance by either single-input/single-output 
model, or standard accounting ratios are too simplistic if not unfair. The financial institutions literature made 
progress in this regard treating banks as going concerns that produce multiple outputs from multiple inputs. 
Answering the call, Charnes et al. (1978) developed the method popularized as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), 
which generalizes the Farrell (1957) single-input/single-output efficiency measures to the multiple-output/multiple 
input case.  
 
We adopt the intermediation approach rather than production approach to define the inputs and outputs of 
banks because we, like majority of the associates in the literature, believe that the former reflects banking production 
process better. Accordingly, all variables except for the input factor labor are measured in millions of U.S. dollars. 
We use the following three items as the inputs, which we assume, employed by the Turkish banks to produce their 
products and services: (1) labor, (2) capital, and (3) funds. The quantity of labor is measured by the number of full-
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time employees on the payroll; capital by the book value of premises and fixed assets; and funds by the sum of 
deposit (demand and time) and non-deposit funds as of the end of the respective year. The following four items are 
selected to represent the outputs of the Turkish banks: (1) short-term loans, (2) long-term loans, (3) risk-adjusted 
off-balance sheet items, and (4) other earning assets. Short-term loans and long-term loans comprise the loans with 
less than and more than a year maturity, respectively. Off-balance sheet activities include guarantees and warranties 
(letters of guarantee, bank acceptance, letters of credit, guaranteed pre-financing, endorsements and others), 
commitments, foreign exchange and interest rate transactions as well as other off-balance sheet activities. Other 
earning assets consist of loans to special sectors (directed and specialized loans), interbank funds sold and 
investment securities (treasury bills, government bonds and other securities). Turkish banks began to report their off-
balance sheet items to the Banks Association of Turkey starting 1986. Therefore, we developed two models to 
measure the productivity and efficiency change scores, one with and another without such items. Because off-
balance sheet activities are mostly fee earning activities that represent the typical feature of modern banking, we call 
the model entailing such activities as Non-Classical Model and the alternative model excluding such items as 
Classical Model.   
 
Because commercial banks and development and investment banks operate in two different environments 
and are subject to distinct regulations, we did not include development and investment banks in our analysis simply 
not to fall in the classic fallacy of orange-apple comparison. The data set used in this study was obtained from the 
Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), which includes all kinds of the banks operating in Turkey (domestic or 
foreign) as member and publishes their financial statements annually. Our data set encompasses the universe of all 
forms of banks operating in Turkey between 1981 and 1990.   
 
Table 2. Sample Statistics For Outputs And Inputs Of Public, Private And Foreign Banks ($US Millions) 
 
 State Banks Private Banks Foreign Banks 
 # Mean S.D. # Mean S.D. # Mean S.D. 
OUTPUTS          
ST Loans 
         
1981 9 212.39 200.24 20 169.44 296.40 6 23.48 51.44 
1982 9 236.77 195.52 20 174.93 325.12 6 25.09 33.80 
1983 9 144.99 103.77 19 157.73 276.79 8 22.03 29.98 
1984 9 146.84 107.16 18 144.73 269.44 10 15.93 20.80 
1985 9 193.19 223.00 18 207.24 353.24 13 21.88 34.93 
1986 9 255.28 311.99 21 245.29 468.27 14 19.73 37.28 
1987 9 373.62 537.45 23 246.75 464.18 17 21.51 35.11 
1988 8 290.16 294.05 23 200.69 332.86 17 20.89 29.58 
1989 8 418.64 348.32 24 257.56 324.65 20 27.90 38.39 
1990 8 568.85 424.64 24 399.39 497.48 21 41.78 54.24 
1981-1986 9 198.24 190.28 19 183.23 331.54 10 21.36 34.71 
1987-1990 8 412.82 401.12 24 276.10 404.79 19 28.02 39.33 
1981-1990 9 284.07 274.61 21 220.38 360.84 13 24.02 36.56 
LT Loans 
         
1981  55.65 139.47  49.17 126.58  9.37 15.04 
1982  15.77 24.88  66.35 174.09  12.25 21.87 
1983  67.17 117.52  62.50 170.34  8.75 20.75 
1984  27.31 30.58  47.57 124.94  8.79 25.09 
1985  48.82 77.05  46.52 116.92  6.86 21.78 
1986  39.29 35.75  47.22 144.54  6.51 19.54 
1987  68.68 65.97  43.29 142.52  5.51 18.78 
1988  67.37 74.35  30.18 97.94  4.17 12.91 
1989  99.48 148.15  34.52 109.21  3.85 11.51 
1990  109.79 136.22  35.68 109.01  2.07 6.46 
1981-1986  42.34 70.88  53.22 142.90  8.76 20.68 
1987-1990  86.33 106.17  35.92 114.67  3.90 12.42 
1981-1990  59.93 84.99  46.30 131.61  6.81 17.37 
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OEA 
         
1981  385.91 877.58  27.50 64.40  3.03 6.94 
1982  327.63 681.24  38.92 105.48  3.11 7.09 
1983  305.95 621.85  31.02 88.46  1.36 2.86 
1984  306.66 578.98  45.17 111.27  2.36 5.74 
1985  431.17 754.60  84.36 213.95  4.02 11.21 
1986  609.43 1076.38  65.16 145.28  4.67 8.77 
1987  748.39 1185.03  92.90 157.17  9.18 17.60 
1988  764.17 1206.75  80.63 140.59  9.85 15.84 
1989  1005.80 1536.55  121.50 175.50  10.66 13.23 
1990  1224.58 1957.52  126.39 161.69  10.23 14.25 
1981-1986  394.46 765.11  48.69 121.47  3.09 7.10 
1987-1990  935.74 1471.46  105.36 158.74  9.98 15.23 
1981-1990  610.97 1047.65  71.36 136.38  5.85 10.35 
OFF-B/S 
         
1986  325.39 291.36  335.20 533.17  51.80 90.64 
1987  500.16 820.28  447.41 649.65  70.76 100.91 
1988  484.85 629.11  347.07 417.81  43.93 73.46 
1989  568.20 569.29  372.55 443.49  53.47 69.47 
1990  635.87 596.60  480.35 523.66  62.39 74.72 
1981-1986  325.39 291.36  335.20 533.17  51.80 90.64 
1987-1990  547.27 653.82  411.85 508.65  57.64 79.64 
1981-1990  502.89 581.33  396.52 513.56  56.47 81.84 
 
 P1: Domestic Public Banks P2: Domestic Private Banks P3: Foreign Private Banks 
 # Mean S.D. # Mean S.D. # Mean S.D. 
INPUTS          
Labor 
         
1981  6559.78 9495.22  2874.00 5112.18  339.00 611.49 
1982  6902.00 9844.74  3044.50 5365.33  397.50 713.67 
1983  7376.67 10868.87  3221.21 5507.52  320.13 622.51 
1984  7677.56 11465.81  3410.78 5673.26  266.30 544.10 
1985  7892.00 11674.29  3464.61 5664.37  198.85 404.80 
1986  8218.56 12254.25  3084.62 5264.46  201.21 442.38 
1987  8710.00 12951.21  2869.17 5024.60  160.06 362.71 
1988  9841.25 13385.86  2928.35 4970.73  160.82 351.96 
1989  10017.63 13516.17  2849.25 4841.43  145.20 299.13 
1990  10103.13 13220.95  2838.92 4627.76  140.48 295.97 
1981-1986  7437.76 10933.86  3183.29 5431.19  287.17 556.49 
1987-1990  9668.00 13268.55  2871.42 4866.13  151.64 327.44 
1981-1990  8329.86 11867.74  3058.54 5205.16  232.96 464.87 
Capital 
         
1981  25.47 33.68  7.63 12.49  1.40 1.56 
1982  27.36 27.81  17.93 33.76  1.54 1.27 
1983  22.43 21.77  14.94 24.97  1.52 2.50 
1984  22.16 23.30  16.26 24.66  1.68 2.37 
1985  27.44 30.20  20.00 29.31  1.75 2.36 
1986  30.67 34.33  21.25 31.27  1.57 2.33 
1987  41.82 40.12  23.60 38.72  1.27 2.27 
1988  97.73 102.51  26.91 42.78  1.29 2.55 
1989  161.10 197.81  35.21 53.31  1.39 2.85 
1990  141.60 135.52  47.61 72.08  1.53 3.06 
1981-1986  25.92 28.52  16.34 26.08  1.58 2.07 
1987-1990  110.56 118.99  33.33 51.72  1.37 2.68 
1981-1990  59.78 64.71  23.13 36.34  1.49 2.31 
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Funds 
         
1981  730.94 1129.38  415.00 767.29  61.46 100.05 
1982  717.58 1001.83  448.30 841.13  78.84 101.16 
1983  698.52 1061.70  404.06 756.91  61.89 89.59 
1984  676.79 1017.96  430.36 814.23  60.02 96.61 
1985  911.81 1421.24  553.44 970.55  52.09 86.71 
1986  1232.61 1722.10  577.56 1051.35  57.54 103.05 
1987  1530.71 2098.97  636.88 1169.22  55.07 92.92 
1988  1505.74 1874.55  553.14 921.09  54.02 75.96 
1989  2047.30 2498.91  636.28 966.15  52.99 66.54 
1990  2492.72 2838.04  791.63 1119.80  61.42 71.46 
1981-1986  828.04 1225.70  471.45 866.91  61.97 96.20 
1987-1990  1894.12 2327.62  654.48 1044.07  55.88 76.72 
1981-1990  1254.47 1666.47  544.67 937.77  59.53 88.41 
1 Labor is measured in terms of number of employees on payroll by the end of the respective year. The table reports sample statistics of bank 
outputs and inputs for different banking forms in the sample: (1) State banks, banks that are owned predominantly by the Turkish taxpayers and 
voters; (2) Private banks, banks whose more than 50% of shares is owned by the Turkish residents; (3) Foreign banks, banks whose more than 
50% of shares is owned by the residents of foreign countries. Outputs: (1) Short-term loans, ST Loans, and (2) Long-term loans, LT Loans: the 
loans with less than and more than a year maturity, respectively; (3) risk-adjusted off-balance sheet items, OFF-B/S: guarantees and warranties 
(letters of guarantee, bank acceptance, letters of credit, guaranteed pre-financing, endorsements and others), commitments, foreign exchange and 
interest rate transactions as well as other off-balance sheet activities; (4) other earning assets, OEA: loans to special sectors, loans sold in inter-
bank market and investment security portfolios (treasury bills, government bonds and other securities). Inputs: (1) Labor: the quantity of labor by 
the number of full-time employees on the payroll; (2) Capital: the book value of premises and fixed assets; (3) Funds: the sum of deposit (demand 
and time) and non-deposit funds as of the end of the respective year. OFF-B/S activities of Turkish banks became available to the public 
beginning from 1986.   
 
 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of inputs and outputs for public banks, private banks and foreign 
banks for the entire study period (1981-1990). As can be seen from the table, reform agenda has been successful in 
attracting new banks to the system. The number of bank entries during the period, especially from foreign banks, is 
impressive. There was no foreign bank entry between 1975-1980. However, the number of foreign owned banks 
operating in Turkey more than quadrupled between 1980-1990. Despite their small market share, foreign bank entry 
in large numbers affected the banking behavior of domestic banks positively, as foreign banks improved the quality 
of manpower and introduced new techniques and practices to the Turkish banking market (Akcaoglu, 1998; Denizer, 
1997; Isik and Hassan, 2002). Indeed, the empirical results from an 80-country study (Claessens et al., 1998) 
indicate that the number of foreign entrants matters rather than their market share. Apparently, foreign banks affect 
local bank competition upon entry rather than after they have gained substantial market share.  
 
5.  Empirical Results And Analysis 
 
Figures 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3 illustrate historical developments on the averages of TFPCH, TECCH and EFFCH 
scores between 1981-1990, respectively, for public, private and foreign banks. The line passing from 1.0 on the y-
axis in these figures is the “demarcation line”. The points above this line indicate improvement whereas the points 
below it indicate deterioration in the relevant index between two periods. Figure 1.1 shows that the productivity 
growth of foreign banks far outweighs that of private banks, whose productivity growth in turn outperforms that of 
public banks, for the most parts of the period. Another interesting observation is that there is an apparent positive 
shift after 1986 and a clear convergence towards the end of the period in the productivity growth indices of those 
banks. Although Figure 1.2 provides a highly volatile picture, the dominance of efficiency changes in driving 
productivity growth in Turkish banking is very obvious from this figure, as efficiency change indices of all forms of 
banks sail incessantly above the demarcation line after 1985. On the other hand, Figure 1.3 that depicts technology 
changes in Turkish banks suggests that the progress in technology is unimpressive throughout the period except for a 
few blinks from foreign banks at the onset and at the end of the period.   
 
Our analysis shows that productivity growth in banking sector coincided with promotion of liberal policies 
in the 1980s. In essence, these developments observed in the productivity and efficiency measures depend on the 
changes in the underlying bank outputs and inputs. In other words, the positive outcome we observed in the 
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productivity of Turkish banks during liberalization was brought in by the developments in bank inputs and outputs 
in this era. Although it is a relative measure, the Malmquist index of a bank in a certain period is closely related to 
the ratio of its “virtual outputs” to its “virtual inputs”: 
 
)(3)(2)(1
)/(4)(3)(2)(1
FundspCapitalpLaborp
SBOFFqOEAqLTLoansqSTLoansq
M


       
 
With the help of the DEA, a mathematical programming technique, we obtained the weights of outputs, q1 
to q4, and the weights of inputs, p1 to p3. In the above form, it is obvious that productivity growth directly originates 
from the changes in the levels of inputs and outputs. For instance, M can increase if outputs increase proportionately 
more than inputs or if inputs decrease proportionately more than outputs. Liberalization affects bank productivity by 
its condensed effects on those inputs and outputs. Hence, one essential question is the changes in what factors of 
production and what types of bank services mostly drove the productivity growth and efficiency change observed in 
different forms of banks during the liberalization of markets in Turkey.  
 
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients between the Malmquist indices and the changes in bank inputs 
and outputs for all forms banks between 1982-90. In general, one would expect that productivity growth should be 
positively correlated with the increases in outputs holding inputs fixed and negatively correlated with the increases 
in inputs holding outputs fixed. However, this may be not true for all cases. For example, one may also expect that 
increases in capital inputs be positively correlated with productivity growth, if such capital increases are mostly in 
the area of automation and computerization. On the other hand, because those investments inflate the level of inputs 
in the denominator, if they cannot bring about higher levels of outputs given their expensive acquisition costs, they 
could cause a reduction in productivity. The same propositions are also valid for other input factors. Our data do not 
contain information regarding the IT investments of Turkish banks. Thus, capital input in our model encompasses 
increases in all types of fixed assets, productive and non-productive. Thus, it is hard to form a prior expectation, thus 
we leave the final judgment to the data. 
 
 
Figure 1. Changes In The Productivity, Efficiency And Technology Of Turkish Banks By Ownership 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Productivity Change: TFPCH
0.5
1
1.5
82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90
Public Private Foreign
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 1 
 48 
 
 
 
Among outputs, productivity growth in public banks is highly positively correlated with the changes in 
long-term loans whereas it is negatively correlated with the changes in short-term loans and off-balance sheet 
activities. As for private banks, productivity growth is positively correlated mostly with the changes in short-term 
loans, then with the changes in long-term loans, other earning assets and off-balance sheet items, respectively. The 
highest correlation of productivity growth in foreign banks is with the changes in off-balance sheet activities, then 
with the changes in short-term loans. As it seems, the correlation between productivity growth and the changes in 
short-term loans is highly negative in public banks and highly positive in private and foreign banks. In the 
inflationary environment of Turkey, because of interest rate risk, private banks prefer to extend mostly short-term 
loans.  
 
In addition, the production of long-term loans is more costly than short-term loans. With their social 
missions, public banks produce the majority of long-term loans in Turkey. For this reason, the productivity growth 
in private banks may be mostly related with short-term loans. Productivity growth in all forms of banks is negatively 
correlated with the changes in all inputs except for funds. This suggests that increases in capital and labor factors do 
not bring more proportionate increases in outputs in Turkish banks. The positive correlation between the changes in 
productivity and the changes in funds suggest that expansion of funds may lead to expansion in the portfolio of bank 
products and services, which result in higher productivity. Because a bank cannot make loans more than its funds, 
increase in funds must be a positive externality for outputs of banks. More funds may mean more customers with 
many banking needs. Technological change is mostly correlated with the changes in long-term loans in public 
banks, and with the changes in short-term loans in private banks, and with the changes in off-balance sheet items in 
Figure 1.2 Efficiency Change: EFFCH
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Figure 1.3 Technology Change: TECCH
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foreign banks. Efficiency change is mainly related to the changes in short-term loans in private banks, to the changes 
in off-balance sheet activities in foreign banks and to the changes in other earning assets in public banks. 
Apparently, off-balance sheet items mostly enhance the productivity, technology and efficiency of foreign banks. 
Scale efficiency changes are generally negatively correlated with the changes in outputs for all forms of banks. 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation Of Productivity Growth (TFPCH) And Its Components (TECCH, EFFCH, PEFFCH, SCH) 
With Changes In Outputs And Inputs Of The Turkish Public, Private And Foreign Banks 1 
 
 Productivity 
Change 
(TFPCH) 
Technological 
Change 
(TECCH) 
Efficiency 
Change 
(EFFCH) 
Pure Efficiency 
Change (PEFFCH) 
Scale 
Change 
(SCH) 
Δ IN BANK 
OUTPUTS 
     
Δ ST Loans      
  Public banks -0.203 -0.189 -0.069 -0.123 0.074 
  Private banks 0.548 0.113 0.362 0.465 -0.114 
  Foreign banks 0.349 0.146 0.171 0.198 -0.029 
  Industry 0.387 0.045 0.252 0.314 -0.055 
Δ LT Loans      
  Public banks 0.253 0.249 0.042 0.003 0.033 
  Private banks 0.437 0.053 0.345 0.381 -0.114 
  Foreign banks -0.036 -0.113 0.025 -0.009 0.040 
  Industry 0.282 0.076 0.204 0.203 0.011 
Δ OEA      
  Public banks 0.019 -0.070 0.094 -0.040 0.121 
  Private banks 0.256 0.096 0.136 0.174 -0.040 
  Foreign banks 0.073 0.163 -0.046 0.054 -0.226 
  Industry 0.191 0.080 0.092 0.124 -0.046 
Δ OFF-B/S      
  Public banks -0.106 0.049 -0.106 0.060 -0.158 
  Private banks 0.135 0.190 0.073 0.073 -0.083 
  Foreign banks 0.557 0.545 0.337 0.555 -0.078 
  Industry 0.314 0.355 0.107 0.162 -0.081 
Δ IN BANK 
INPUTS 
     
Δ Labor      
  Public banks -0.115 0.008 -0.093 -0.116 -0.010 
  Private banks -0.084 -0.097 -0.014 0.028 -0.067 
  Foreign banks -0.271 -0.034 -0.240 -0.271 0.032 
  Industry -0.101 -0.065 -0.044 -0.025 -0.042 
Δ Capital      
  Public banks -0.098 0.100 -0.138 -0.218 0.058 
  Private banks -0.167 -0.238 -0.067 -0.082 0.049 
  Foreign banks -0.279 -0.160 -0.171 -0.242 0.183 
  Industry -0.129 -0.07 -0.084 -0.128 0.072 
Δ Funds      
  Public banks -0.136 -0.093 -0.091 -0.165 0.091 
  Private banks 0.219 0.081 0.085 0.163 -0.115 
  Foreign banks 0.197 -0.009 0.141 0.104 0.059 
  Industry 0.170 0.028 0.075 0.108 -0.040 
1. Pearson correlation coefficients between the variables are based on the pooled data from 1981 to 1990. Whereas, correlations including off- 
balance sheet items are for the pooled data from 1986 to 1990 due to unavailability of such data before 1986. 
 
 
International Business & Economics Research Journal Volume 3, Number 1 
 50 
Conclusion 
 
This paper employs a DEA-type Malmquist index approach to evaluate the impact of financial 
liberalization on the productivity changes of public, private and foreign banks in Turkey during the period between 
1981 and 1990. The results indicate that all forms of banks have benefited from financial liberalization period. 
However the response was different across different ownership forms. Due to their relatively smaller size and more 
dynamic structure, foreign banks and private banks reacted better to liberalization. Foreign banks were found to be 
the most productive, followed by private banks and public banks respectively. It also seems that productivity growth 
indices of all banks converge towards the end of financial sector liberalization period.  
 
The productivity growth in public banks is driven mostly by efficiency increases stemming mainly from 
scale improvements. The productivity growth in private banks is also mostly fueled with efficiency changes 
originating mainly from scale changes. In contrast, foreign banks owe their productivity growth mostly to 
technological changes rather than efficiency changes. Unlike in domestic banks, efficiency increases in foreign 
banks mainly originate from better resource management practices rather than scale changes. 
 
During liberalization period, increased funding costs, technical advances and competitive pressures forced 
domestic bank managers to contract the scale of their operations by trimming excess labor and unprofitable 
branches. The downsizing policies of domestic banks eventually resulted in higher productivity per employee, per 
dollar invested in capital, and per dollar of collected funds. On the other hand, foreign banks did not have 
diseconomies of scale problems, as they did not operate large network of branches. Therefore, scale improvements 
play lesser role in fueling foreign bank efficiency. Instead, their efficiency improvements seem to be coming mainly 
from technology investments and better management practices they exported from international markets. Apparently 
opening policies have been beneficial as lifting of entry barriers brought in efficient and productive foreign banks 
from which local banks could learn new systems and practices. 
 
On the other hand, looking back to the 1980s from today, it can be argued that benefits from the financial 
liberalization have not been fully realized. The fact that existing oligopolistic and highly concentrated market 
structure was largely unaffected explains the absence of a more effective competition. Particularly in the 1990s, 
predominance of the public banks in the system has created an uneven playing field in the banking sector due to the 
fact that both their borrowing and lending operations have been politicized. Although these institutions have enjoyed 
the benefit of state support and public confidence with respect to safety of deposits, they emerged as major 
instruments of rent distribution in the political process as well. These banks were also characterized as inefficient 
management, inadequate staff motivation and strict labor regulations. Under a more transparent and effective system 
it could be seen that public banks have been carrying much larger amount of non-performing loans than private 
banks. This fact was clearly observed in the two big banking crises of 1990s.  
 
Turkish banking sector could also benefit more from the presence of foreign banks. Foreign banks‟ 
activities were restricted, and limits were placed on the number of branches they could open. Foreign banks 
accounted for a small share of banking transactions and have had a relatively small impact on the performance of 
domestic institutions given that the market remained oligopolistic and segmented. However, domestic firms were 
able to capture productivity changes, which arose from the adoption of new technology and practices introduced by 
the foreign banks.  
 
Given the relationship between macroeconomic environment and banking sector development, policy 
makers should be cautious in identifying policy instruments that are effective in bringing about changes in 
productivity and efficiency and come up with the best policy response. Macroeconomic instability can distort 
banking sector development and affect the performance of the banks. In the case of Turkey, among others, high 
inflationary environment probably affected the financial system‟s efficiency. From this perspective, macroeconomic 
stability may be a prerequisite for liberalization policies to improve the efficiency of credit allocation at the 
microeconomic level.   
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